



The Good News and the Bad News
William C. Whitford
In 2015, the ABA Task Force on Financing Legal Education reported a 
vast increase in law school-administered fi nancial aid over the previous ten 
years. Financial aid administered by law schools was even the most rapidly 
rising cost factor for law schools collectively.1 At fi rst glance this increase might 
seem like some good news for persons sharing my values and worldview. 
Historically fi nancial aid has been associated with helping the fi nancially 
needy, encouraging them and members of underrepresented identities to 
attend law school, and helping make it possible for students who want to 
devote their careers to low-paying, public-interest-oriented work to achieve 
their dreams. In fact, however, as the task force makes clear, almost all the 
increased fi nancial aid is being awarded to applicants with high LSAT scores 
and high undergraduate GPAs—what is called “merit” these days.2 Any 
correlation between the benefi ciaries of increased fi nancial aid and the kinds 
of students who traditionally benefi ted from law school-administered fi nancial 
aid is purely coincidental.
The recent increases in law school-administered fi nancial aid have taken 
place as law schools cope with their most turbulent decade in my lifetime. 
They face decreasing applications and enrollments, rapidly rising tuition, 
rapidly rising aggregate student debt levels at graduation, and intense 
competition between comparable law schools for rankings by U.S. News & World 
1. TASK FORCE ON FINANCING LEGAL EDUCATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT (2015), 
at 37 (figure 11), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/2015_june_report_of_the_aba_
task_force_on_the_fi nancing_of_legal_education.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6JPZ-QJ9X] [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT]. The report divides the expenses 
of running a law school into three primary categories: instructional salaries, administrative 
salaries, and grants/scholarships. Only the latter category has grown per full-time equivalent 
student throughout the period for which the task force had data (AY 2004-05 to AY 2012-13). 
Id. at 36 (fi gures 10a and 10b). See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2. Id. at 28–30. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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5Report.3 These developments account for the dramatic increase in law school-
administered fi nancial aid, as well as the decisions law schools make about 
how to distribute that increased aid, as I will explain. I will conclude this essay 
with some discussion of the possibilities of redirecting a substantial part of this 
increased fi nancial aid, so that it might better fulfi ll the objectives traditionally 
associated with law school-administered fi nancial aid. 
In this essay I rely upon empirical evidence gathered by others—especially 
the task force report4—and upon generally accepted assumptions about 
developments in legal education, and their causes. I have paid particular 
attention to Brian Tamanaha’s provocative 2012 book, Failing Law Schools,5 
and the considerable literature it has spawned.6 A good deal of this literature 
addresses Tamanaha’s concern that law schools toward the bottom of U.S. 
News rankings charge students more aggregate tuition than those students can 
expect as a return on their investment in the form of enhanced income after 
graduation.7 This concern, though a real one, is not the subject of this essay.8 
I focus instead on developments within roughly the top 100 law schools as 
ranked by U.S. News.
What Has Happened in the Twenty-First Century
The ABA’s Task Force on Financing Legal Education (hereinafter ABA 
Task Force 2) was formed at the recommendation of the ABA’s earlier Task 
Force on the Future of Legal Education (hereinafter ABA Task Force 1).9 ABA 
Task Force 1 documented increasing law school tuitions, the resultant increases 
in graduating students’ debt loads, and the increasing practice of distributing 
available fi nancial aid on the basis of “merit” rather than “need.”10 Concerned 
3. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS (annual) contains a section devoted 
to ranking American law schools. Partial information from this section of the latest year 
is available online. Top Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. EDUC., https://www.usnews.
com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools (last visited Aug. 11, 2017).
4. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1.
5. BRIAN TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
6. The critique of Tamanaha of greatest relevance to this essay is Philip Schrag, Failing Law 
Schools—Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387 (2013). See also Randall 
Shephard, The Problem of Law School Discounting—How Do We Sustain Equal Opportunity in the 
Profession?, 50 IND. L. REV. 1 (2016).
7. E.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, It’s Not About Us: Beyond the Job Market Critique of U.S. Law Schools, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2013).
8. Much good and current information on this topic is reported in a wonderful website 
maintained by Law School Transparency, a nonprofi t organization. See LAW SCH. 
TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
9. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
30 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HQ9J-DUFW] [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 1 REPORT].
10. Id. at 22–23.
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that these developments were unfair and inhibiting access to law schools, Task 
Force 1 recommended formation of ABA Task Force 2 to consider possible 
remedies, and the ABA quickly acted upon this recommendation.
ABA Task Force 2 proceeded to gather the most complete dat a on law school 
fi nances, including law school-administered fi nancial aid, that has been made 
public to date.11 Each law school has long been required to provide detailed 
fi nancial data about its costs and expenses, including fi nancial aid, to the 
ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (hereinafter “the 
section”), the accrediting agency for legal education institutions. The section 
treats reports to it by individual law schools as proprietary and confi dential.12 
Because law schools compete for students and rankings, the schools do not 
want their detailed data shared with rivals. ABA Task Force 2 was able to 
get the section to make much of the reported data available to it, on the 
understanding that the data would be used only to create tables and graphs 
showing collective trends. ABA Task Force 2 did not break down its collective 
data by tiers—that is, in which quartile or quintile a law school stood in the 
U.S. News rankings.13 It is possible, perhaps likely, that law school fi nancial aid 
policies vary by which tier in the rankings the school occupies, but it is not 
possible to learn or validate that from the report.14 Nonetheless the ABA Task 
Force 2 has provided the best data available on what is happening with tuition 
levels, aggregate student indebtedness, and fi nancial aid in our law schools.
The ABA Task Force 2 data confi rm the widely held impressions that since 
Academic Year (AY) 2009-2010, law school enrollments have been declining, 
11. Published elsewhere in this issue is an article reporting even more detailed information 
about law school tuitions, but this information is based on modeling, as described in the 
appendix to the article. Though the models seem reasonable, the information published 
is not data as such, just good guesses based on reasonable models. Jerome M. Organ, Net 
Tuition Trends by LSAT Category  from 2010 to 2014 with Thoughts on Variable Return on Investment, 67 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 51 (Autumn 2017).
12. The section requires that some of the information submitted be made publicly available, 
annually, on law school websites, in what is called a Standard 509 Information Report. E.g., 
University of Wisconsin—2015 Standard 509 Information Report, U. WIS. L. SCH., https://law.wisc.
edu/prospective/admissions/documents/std509inforeport-162-2730-12-11-2015_11-26-01.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/L6ZK-NBX6] (for Wisconsin Law School). The 
same information for all schools can be found at SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS 
TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES,www.abareqireddisclosres.
org(last visited September 6, 2017) section. The 509 information report includes a good 
deal of information about law school-administered fi nancial aid, including the percentage 
of students receiving at least some aid, the percentage receiving full tuition or more, and the 
percentage receiving at least fi fty percent to ninety-nine percent of tuition. But the required 
509 disclosures do not report whether the aid is awarded on the basis of “merit” or “need,” 
nor do they report the average student indebtedness at graduation. ABA TASK FORCE 2 
REPORT, supra note 1 includes information about these latter matters, though not broken 
down by individual school.
13. Its tables and graphs do, however, distinguish between public and private schools.
14. Organ’s article in this issue estimates, based on his modeling, considerable diff erences. See 
Organ, supra note 11.
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while tuition levels and aggregate student indebtedness (of graduates) have 
risen dramatically and steadily since AY 1999, and continue to do so. Annual 
tuition has increased over a hundred percent between AY 1999-2000 and AY 
2014-2015 for public law schools on an infl ation-adjusted basis.15 Average 
student indebtedness at graduation, on an infl ation-adjusted basis, increased 
about thirty-three percent for public law school students between AY 2004-
2005 and AY 2012-2013.16 
The fi nding with respect to law school-administered fi nancial aid, which 
has stimulated this essay, is as follows: “[T]he greatest percentage increase (in 
law school expenditures per student) came in grants/scholarships to use in 
discounting tuition. Between AY 2004-05 and AY 2012-13, the average increase 
for public law school grants/scholarships expenditures was 99%, while for 
private law schools the average increase was 44%.”17
Increases in law school-administered fi nancial aid have not kept up with 
increases in tuition when the entire period beginning in AY 1999 is considered, 
but since AY 2009 they have come close. During this period what both task 
forces call net tuition (tuition less grants/scholarships) has remained stable 
for private schools, while for public schools in the post-AY 2009 period net 
tuition has increased at less than half the rate of net tuition increases in the 
preceding ten years.18
ABA Task Force 2 looked into how much of the increased fi nancial aid was 
being awarded on the basis of “merit” as opposed to “need,” or what Task 
Force 2 called “need plus.”19 The available data come from the information 
that the section required law schools to report for a period of years that ended 
in AY 2009-2010. The data are not very reliable because the section has never 
15. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. The rate of increase in infl ation-adjusted 
private law tuition for the same period was considerably less but nonetheless substantial. Id.
16. Id. at 8. The equivalent fi gure for private law schools is about twenty-fi ve percent. Id. The 
period measured for student indebtedness levels, as reported by the ABA Task Force 2, 
is diff erent from the period used for tuition levels, presumably because of the data made 
available to it.
17. Id. at 9. See also id. at 34–37.
18. Id. at 27–28. Organ estimates that net tuition has decreased between 2010 and 2014 for 
middle tier schools (in U.S. News rankings), based on his modeling. Organ, supra note 11, at 56 
(Figure 1).
19. Throughout this essay I put the words “merit,” “need,” and “need plus” in quotation marks. 
With respect to the latter two categories, that is because there is no consensus understanding 
of what the measures of “need” should be in a fi nancial aid scheme that targets needy 
students. With respect to “merit,” I am convinced that substantial consensus does exist 
as concerns decisions about fi nancial aid—LSAT score and undergraduate GPA—but I use 
quotation marks nonetheless to show that I dissent from the exclusive reliance on these 
measures to defi ne “merit.” Such a defi nition does not include reference to any graduate 
school record or other post-undergrad work experience, for example, presumably because 
the U.S. News rankings do not consider these factors in measuring “selectivity.” Stated 
otherwise, for purposes for fi nancial aid an applicant with “merit” is one who will help the 
school’s ranking by matriculating, and nothing else.
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provided clear guidelines to reporting schools for what should be considered a 
“merit” or “need” award, so schools did not apply the same criteria. Nonetheless 
the data suggested that nearly all the increase in fi nancial aid went to “merit” 
or “needs plus” awards. Pure “need” awards remained largely stable during 
this period, essentially at historic levels.20 Testimony received by the ABA Task 
Force 2 from law school deans reinforced these conclusions. One dean spoke 
of a “merit scholarship arms race.”21 The ABA Task Force 2 did not attempt to 
assess what is meant by “merit” in its report, but anecdotal evidence convinces 
me it refers almost exclusively to the LSAT and undergraduate GPA scores 
that are relied on strongly by the U.S. News rankings to determine a school’s 
“selectivity.”
Should Merit Aid Be Shifted to Need?
Quite a few people, including both task forces, have expressed distress 
that the distribution of the vast increase in law school-administered fi nancial 
aid has been almost exclusively to students selected for “merit.” The biggest 
concern is for increased fi nancial aid funded by tuition increases. These tuition 
increases are not paid by the “merit” awardees of fi nancial aid, who receive their 
“merit”-based fi nancial aid as tuition discounts.22 And because these students 
do not receive sizable tuition discounts, the tuition increases contribute, often 
substantially, to their aggregate student indebtedness upon graduation. It is 
presumed—reasonably, I think, but I have not seen an empirical study on this 
point—that students with higher LSATs and undergraduate GPAs have better 
prospects than their classmates for higher-paying employment opportunities 
upon graduation. The net eff ect is that lower-LSAT students are subsidizing 
the legal education of higher-LSAT students, when the latter are more likely to 
have the postgraduate income that will allow them to repay substantial student 
indebtedness without undue hardship. In the words of Brian Tamanaha:23 
“Law schools have in eff ect constructed a reverse Robin Hood arrangement, 
20. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 28–30. For a recently published study that 
validates this fi nding, based on a student survey in which the students self-report whether 
they received a “merit” scholarship, see LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 
2016 ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS: LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES OF INEQUITY 
(2017), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-2016-Annual-Report.
pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/HZ8R-93P4] [hereinafter LAW SCHOOL 
SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES].
21. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
22. The clear trend is for schools to grant some kind of tuition discount to an ever-increasing 
percentage of students. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1 found that in AY 2013–2014 
about sixty percent of law students received some kind of tuition discount. Id. at 9. In this 
essay I assume that these discounts are distributed in a skewed fashion, with the highest-
LSAT students receiving the highest discounts and students at the LSAT median or below 
receiving much more modest discounts. Organ makes a similar assumption in constructing 
his models. Jerome M Organ, supra note 11.
23. TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 99. If one assumes that there is a correlation between LSAT 
score and the wealth of the applicant’s family of origin, as I think is likely, then Tamanaha’s 
“reverse Robin Hood” characterization is even more appropriate.
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redistributing resources between students, making the (likely) poorer future 
graduates help pick up the tab for the (likely) wealthier future graduates.”
When the resources for additional fi nancial aid are derived from tuition 
increases, the normative argument for shifting increased aid to “need” rather 
than “merit” is based on distributional fairness, dramatized by Tamanaha’s 
“reverse Robin Hood” characterization. However, not all the increased 
fi nancial aid comes from tuition increases, and in some schools none of the 
increased aid funds are derived in that way.24 Even when the resources for 
increased aid come from sources other than tuition increases, strong arguments 
exist for shifting increased fi nancial aid away from “merit” awards to entering 
law students. I would redirect the awards to entering students with need and to 
law graduates with low incomes through loan repayment assistance programs 
(hereinafter LRAPs). My rationales are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Historically, when law school-administered fi nancial aid was commonly 
distributed on a “need” basis, aid was thought to help students from families 
who could not help them fi nancially to enroll in a law school. Today access 
to legal education is facilitated by student loan programs, which will provide 
students suffi  cient resources to cover tuition and reasonable living expenses 
without working while in law school. Given the rapid tuition increases, 
however, as well as the less-than-robust employment markets for recent law 
graduates, there must be potential law students coming from families with 
limited fi nancial resources who are deciding simply not to incur the heavy 
indebtedness that a law school education would demand.25 Legal education 
is the gateway to the legal profession. For persons who value class diversity 
in the legal profession,26 as I do, there is still a strong case for distributing 
fi nancial aid on a “need” basis in order to encourage matriculation. Few other 
ways exist to enhance diversity in background within the legal profession.
I also argue for shifting fi nancial aid from “merit” awards to entering 
students to LRAPs for law graduates needing assistance in repaying student 
24. At my former law school, Wisconsin, for example, all tuition goes into the campus’s general 
fund. The law school receives an annual budget from the university administration, but 
that budget is not directly dependent on tuition raised in any given year. Any relationship 
between tuition raised and resources available to the law school, including those that could 
be spent on fi nancial aid, is only long term, if there is one at all. So when Wisconsin directs 
increased spending to fi nancial aid for “merit” students, in the immediate term it must fi nd 
those funds from enhanced donor giving, from an enhanced stipend from the university 
administration, or from cuts to other programs.
25. I am not aware of good data showing reasons for the decline in law school applications over 
the past fi ve-plus years, but I assume that rising tuitions is one important factor, despite the 
ready availability of federally guaranteed student loans to cover those tuition increases. For 
a similar lament about the impact of rising tuitions coupled with tuition discounting for 
“merit” students, see Shephard, supra note 6. Mr. Shephard, formerly Chief Justice of the 
Indiana Supreme Court, was chair of ABA Task Force 1.
26. I would also justify shifting aid from “merit” to “diversity,” whether or not the diversity 
applicants have “need,” on similar grounds—that is, a commitment to improved demographics 
in the legal profession of the future—but I haven’t developed that argument in this essay.
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loan indebtedness. Student loan indebtedness for law graduates has been 
rising along with tuition levels, and the amounts have become staggering, 
exceeding $100,000 for the median graduate.27 Professor Philip Schrag, in 
several publications, has rightly emphasized that the potential hardships 
facing these students has been signifi cantly reduced by federal government 
subsidy programs developed for persons carrying more student loan 
indebtedness than they can comfortably handle.28 Under the current income-
based repayment plans (called PAYE and REPAYE), most persons owing the 
federal government can elect to set their student loan indebtedness payment at 
ten percent of disposable income, even if that amount is less than the interest 
accruing on the loan. If payments are maintained, any balance remaining 
unpaid at the end of twenty-fi ve years is forgiven.29 However, as Professor 
Schrag has recognized, these generous repayment and forgiveness terms may 
not be stable. Both the President, by executive order, and Congress can alter 
or repeal these terms. President Trump proposed signifi cant changes in the 
2018 budget which, if enacted, would negatively aff ect law graduate student 
27. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 32 (fi gure 9), reported an average aggregate 
indebtedness in AY 2012-2013 of $127,000 for private schools and of $88,000 for public law 
schools. The well-known Tax Prof blog reports average aggregate indebtedness for 2015 
graduates of each of the top twenty-fi ve law schools. The totals ranged from $144,000 to 
$175,000, suggesting the amounts continue to rise. Paul Caron, 2017 U.S. News Law School 
Rankings: Average Student Debt, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 18, 2016), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/taxprof_blog/2016/03/2017-us-news-law-school-rankingsaverage-student-debt.html 
[https://perma.cc/ML6V-EFZX]. It must be remembered that these numbers are averages. 
Many graduates have much higher debt loads. And these fi gures do not report all student 
debt, excluding accrued interest at graduation as well as undergraduate indebtedness.
28. E.g., Schrag, supra note 5. And Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre have rightly pointed 
out that for most law graduates, the investment in legal education is likely to yield a positive 
return over a lifetime, when compared with earnings likely obtained by persons not pursuing 
education beyond a bachelor’s degree. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic 
Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 284 (2014) (“For most law school graduates, the 
benefi ts of a law degree exceed its cost by a large margin.”). “[O]ur results suggest that 
attending law school is generally a better fi nancial decision than terminating education with 
a bachelor’s degree.” Id. at 285. See also Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, Populist Outrage, 
Reckless Empirics: A Review of Failing Law Schools, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 176 (2014).
29. Schrag, supra note 5, at 396–97. Discretionary income is defi ned as adjusted gross income 
(from tax returns) less 150% of the poverty level for a family of the graduate’s family size. 
Any forgiven amounts are subject to tax at the time of forgiveness, which will be a sizable tax 
jolt. Persons who hold public-interest jobs receive even more generous forgiveness terms. For 
more information on repayment plans, see the Department of Education’s guidance, Work 
with Your Loan Servicer to Choose a Federal Student Loan Repayment Plan That’s Best for You, FED. STUDENT 
AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/4TB3-R8GW], as well as guidance for law graduates specifi cally provided 
by the AccessLex Institute: THE ROAD TO ZERO: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO STUDENT LOAN 
REPAYMENT (Mar. 017), https://www.accesslex.org/sites/default/fi les/2017-03/29398_road_
to_zero_legal_fi nal3.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DVM-TR7P].
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loan indebtedness incurred in 2018 or later.30 While these budget proposals 
still must make their way through Congress, where they may not be accepted, 
in my judgment similar proposals will become increasingly probable as 
the cost to the federal budget of promised loan forgiveness becomes more 
immediate.31 It is well-established that aggregate student loan indebtedness 
now exceeds aggregate credit card indebtedness, and most of it is owed to the 
federal government and eligible for forgiveness.32
Little beyond anecdote has been published about the hardships imposed 
on persons carrying large student indebtedness—for example, in securing a 
mortgage loan to purchase a home—even assuming they have elected to repay 
that indebtedness under the currently generous income-based repayment 
plans. But it is hard to believe such hardships are not substantial for the 
large number of law school graduates with aggregate indebtedness exceeding 
$100,000, many with indebtedness well in excess of that amount.33 I believe 
law schools should be concerned about the quality of life of their graduates.
Financial aid programs for matriculating students based on “need” can help 
address the problem of law graduate overindebtedness, but I am suggesting 
that LRAP programs, or what I like to call back-ended needs-based fi nancial 
aid, are a more effi  cient method to distribute fi nancial aid where it is most 
needed. A student may graduate with very large accumulated indebtedness, but 
if the student secures employment with a six-fi gure income, that indebtedness 
is not likely to be a substantial hardship. It is students who decline and/or 
are unable to obtain such employment who face the potential problems of 
overindebtedness, and they are best identifi ed by a back-ended fi nancial aid 
program. LRAP programs can also facilitate greater law graduate choice 
30. The most signifi cant changes for law graduates would extend the minimum payment 
period before eligibility for forgiveness for student loan “graduate” debt to thirty years, 
and increase the minimum annual payments for low-income earners to 12.5% of disposable 
income. The proposed budget would also eliminate the special ten-year forgiveness period 
for graduates with public-interest employment. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump and 
DeVos Plan to Reshape Higher Education Finance. Here’s What It Might Mean for You, WASH. POST 
(May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/05/17/
trump-and-devos-plan-to-reshape-higher-education-fi nance-heres-what-it-might-mean-for-
you/?utm_term=.1c0997295335 [https://perma.cc/DBC3-ECZK].
31. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 2, at 57–62 (Separate Statement of Professor Philip 
Schrag, a member of Task Force 2). The forgiveness features apply only to persons who have 
graduated after 2007, so with few exceptions the forgiveness “promises” have not yet aff ected 
federal revenues. There has been concern expressed in the media about the rising burden 
on the federal budget from the forgiveness programs. See Jason Delisle, The Sprialing Costs of 
a Student Loan Relief Program, POLITICO, July 21, 2017, https://www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2017/07/21/public-service-loan-forgiveness-cost-double-000478 (last visited Sept. 8, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/Q6FQ-HDM3].
32. See Sreekar Jasthi, Credit Card, Student Loans and Mortgage Debt in the U.S., NERDWALLET, https://
www.nerdwallet.com/blog/credit-card-data/credit-card-student-loans-mortgage-debt-
comparison (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QMN6-D6FY].
33. For recent accounts of the hardships imposed by student loans, see Editorial, Student Debt’s 
Grip on the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2017, at SR 10.
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in selecting jobs. Many graduates may prefer to pursue low-paying public-
interest jobs (e.g., civil legal aid), or to work in smaller communities where 
legal needs are substantial but lawyer salaries lower, even when better-paying 
opportunities are available.34 Count me among those who not only value law 
graduate choice in selection of a job but also welcome choices that provide 
legal services to sectors of the population whose legal needs are underserved. 
The latter would seem a particularly appropriate emphasis for a public law 
school, partially supported by tax revenues.
Not only do I personally favor a shift from “merit”- to “need”-based 
fi nancial aid, including LRAP, but I think many law schools would implement 
this shift if they were free of the pressures created by the U.S. News rankings. 
As evidence of that conclusion, I off er the fi nancial aid plans off ered by three 
law schools that are largely free of those pressures—Harvard, Stanford, and 
Yale. These schools do not have to compete for high-ranking students because 
they are assured, by their reputations and previous rankings, of a student 
body with high “selectivity” scores. They are also very well-endowed, receive 
large donations from graduates as annual giving, and have lots of resources 
to devote to fi nancial aid. I will briefl y describe Yale’s program as an example 
of the kind of fi nancial aid program that I believe many law schools would, 
and should, adopt if they were free of the pressures to increase the amount of 
“merit”-based aid. Obviously most schools cannot aff ord to be as generous as 
Yale, but they could assign whatever resources are available for fi nancial aid in 
the same categories as Yale.
Yale Law School distributes its fi nancial aid on a needs-only basis. Some 
of the aid is given to current students as grants during their studies. The 
balance is given to graduates through what Yale calls a Career Options 
Assistance Program (COAP), basically an LRAP program. The student 
grants are awarded after a complicated calculation that takes account of the 
student’s savings, what parents can be expected to contribute if the student is 
twenty-eight or younger, any spouse’s income, and what the student should 
be expected to incur as loans. Parents and a spouse must submit fi nancial 
information forms.35 The COAP program is very generous, much more 
generous than the federal PAYE plan. Annual debt payments for graduates 
of moderate income are lower under COAP, and COAP enables graduates to 
34. Both task forces addressed the unmet need for legal services, especially civil legal services, 
by the economically less advantaged. Both explored the possibility of meeting some of those 
needs by persons with less than a full legal education. See also Shephard, supra note 25, at 
12–13.
35. See How Need-Based Aid Works, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/
cost-fi nancial-aid/how-need-based-aid-works (last visited Sept. 8, 2017[https://perma.
cc/65KK-LVEW].
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pay off  their law school loans over a ten-year period, rather than over twenty 
years under PAYE.36
Can Law Schools Shift from Merit- to Need-Based Financial Aid?
It has been frequently observed that competition for U.S. News rankings 
has caused both the increase in law school-administered fi nancial aid and its 
almost exclusive assignment to “merit”-based aid. Law schools are obviously 
concerned that if they do not off er fi nancial aid, usually in the form of tuition 
discounts, to applicants with high LSATs and GPAs, their median scores on 
those measures, so important to U.S. News’s selectivity score, will go down. 
In regretting the almost exclusive assignment of additional fi nancial aid to 
“merit” students, I am hardly the fi rst to assign deleterious consequences to 
the competition for rankings.37 But it is important to stress this point. Student 
selectivity is weighted substantially in U.S. News rankings.38 As importantly, 
selectivity is a variable that schools believe they can control or manipulate 
more easily than other variables weighted in the rankings. A school (other 
than the very elite, like Yale) that signifi cantly shifted fi nancial aid from 
“merit” to “need” could reasonably fear that fewer high-LSAT and/or high-
GPA students would matriculate, with a consequent lowering of the median 
scores on those factors and a drop in the ratings. The extent of the drop is far 
from clear—I know of no schools that have experimented—but this uncertainty 
simply increases the risk adversity of schools to actions that can cause a drop 
in the rankings. A drop in the ratings can have deleterious consequences to 
a dean’s career, to the job prospects at top fi rms for the school’s graduates, 
to the willingness of alumni to donate, and to the ability of faculty to place 
publications in top law reviews.
An obvious solution to these diffi  culties is to get law schools to act in 
concert. To gain control of fi nancial aid policy, law schools, or a signifi cant 
group of them, might agree to implement a common fi nancial aid policy that 
gave much greater emphasis to need, and then no single law school would lose 
ground in the rankings competition for choosing such a course. Something 
similar was proposed by Professor Deborah Merritt in a letter she sent to ABA 
Task Force 1, suggesting an accreditation standard that required law schools 
to award at least fi fty percent of available fi nancial aid funds on the basis of 
36. Students earning less than $50,000 annually are not expected to pay anything toward 
loan repayment. Then the subsidies are scaled down as income rises. See Post Graduate Loan 
Repayment: The Career Options Assistance Program (COAP), YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.
edu/admissions/cost-fi nancial-aid/post-graduate-loan-repayment (last visited Sept. 8, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/2AP5-33LC].
37. E.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 71-103.
38. Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS: EDUC. 
(Mar. 31, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/
articles/law-schools-methodology (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5MWV-
XB2C]. Selectivity is weighted as twenty-fi ve percent of a law school’s “score,” with median 
LSAT and undergraduate GPA constituting most of the selectivity measure.
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need.39 But Task Force 1 agreed that such use of accreditation standards would 
probably violate antitrust standards,40 as may any agreement or compact to 
so act entered into by a sizable group of law schools. However, Deborah 
Merritt and her husband have argued to the contrary in an article published 
in this issue. 41 Some of the Merritts’ ideas require Justice Department or 
Congressional action. The reader can decide how likely such action will be 
during the Trump administration.
An alternative approach would be to persuade U.S. News to change its metrics 
for the rankings. One obvious approach would be to give schools credit for 
having a fi nancial aid program that emphasizes “need,” but this would require 
some kind of reliable measure of what constitutes an award based on “need.” 
That might be easier if only LRAP programs were considered for this credit. 
U.S. News might also reduce the weight assigned to selectivity in its algorithm, 
so that law schools that chose to reassign fi nancial aid from “merit” to “need” 
would take less rankings risk. Another approach, which would still allow U.S. 
News to include in its algorithm the current weight for “selectivity,” would be to 
limit the LSAT and GPA scores used to calculate a median to those scores for 
entering students who receive a tuition discount no greater than twenty-fi ve 
percent per year. The rationale for such a limitation would be that a student 
who enrolls only because of a generous aid award, perhaps even a full tuition 
discount, signals little about her/his evaluation of the school’s quality, and 
hence his/her matriculation decision indicates little about the quality of the 
school relative to competitors.42 If this last change were adopted, a school 
would have an incentive to award its highest-LSAT and -GPA applicants only 
a modest fi nancial incentive, perhaps reserving the funds saved for some kind 
LRAP program. I think any of these kinds of change in the metrics used by U.S. 
39. Letter from Professor Deborah Merritt, The Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Law, to ABA Task 
Force 1, May 11, 2013 [https://perma.cc/44UU-TF3L] [hereinafter Deborah Merritt Letter]. 
The letter is discussed in Shephard, supra note 25, at 10–11. See also Deborah Jones Merritt & 
Andrew Lloyd Merritt, Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
17 (2017).
40. The ABA is already under a consent decree that forbids it from adopting accreditation 
standards that regulate the salaries paid to law school employees, including faculty. See 
U.S. v. American Bar Association, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIVISION (last updated July 9, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-american-bar-association (fi nal judgment June 
27, 1995). It would be consistent with this decree to forbid the use of accreditation standards 
to limit competition among schools in attracting students through fi nancial aid policy.
41. Deborah Merritt & Andrew Merritt, supra note 39, passim.
42. I appreciate that many people believe that enrolling many high-LSAT students improves 
the quality of a school, even if they do not pay any tuition. If U.S. News wanted to refl ect that 
value, it could base its selectivity score partly on median LSAT (and GPA) of all students 
and partly the medians for students who, by paying at least seventy-fi ve percent tuition, are 
expressing an opinion about the quality of the school.
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News could be eff ective in getting schools to alter their fi nancial aid policies.43 
I am not experienced, in any way, in trying to persuade U.S. News to change its 
metrics, and so have no basis for assessing the likelihood of persuading it.44
Finally, an individual law school could decide to do what I regard as the 
right thing, accepting whatever consequences for its rankings that ensue.45 
Were I still able to vote on a faculty, I would urge precisely that. And I am 
pleased to be able to say that former Dean Frank Wu just shared similar views 
in print:
Instead of identifying talented individuals who lack resources—the “strivers” 
we claim to admire—we [law schools] are reinforcing economic hierarchy 
[through our scholarship distribution policies]. We are sending the message 
that those who already have so much, deserve so much more. We must do 
better. The soul of legal education is at stake.46
I conclude this essay by highlighting two recommendations of ABA Task 
Force 2 that are of relevance to this essay and can be achieved relatively easily. 
First, ABA Task Force 2 recommends that the section resume collecting 
information about the amount and percentage of law school-administered 
fi nancial aid distributed on a “merit” and a “need” basis, and that the section 
then make public the information for each school.47 Second, it recommends 
that the section mandate that each law school provide more debt counseling 
to its students and graduates than is now required by the U.S. Department 
of Education.48 Both recommendations, if implemented, would be good 
43. One eff ect would probably be to cause some schools to reduce their fi nancial aid budgets 
and divert the funds to other purposes. Perhaps one eff ect would be a reduction in that 
part of tuition now used to fund fi nancial aid awards, which would not be all bad. It would 
eff ectively be a pro rata distribution of aid. Hopefully schools would divert more of their 
fi nancial aid funds to LRAP programs, using the existence of a well-funded program as a 
recruiting tool.
44. A concerted eff ort by law schools to get U.S. News to change its rankings metrics runs the 
risk of constituting an antitrust violation. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. Cf. JTC 
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). Individual law schools 
not acting in concert could, however, contact Robert Morse, the chief data strategist for U.S. 
News & World Report, who is in charge of developing the methodologies used by U.S. News in 
compiling its various rankings of educational institutions.
45. It might even be possible for a school to promote its needs-based fi nancial aid policy, 
including an expansive LRAP system, as a way of attracting a niche group of students who, 
despite lacking the highest LSAT scores, nonetheless will enrich the student body as well 
as the profession later. In that way it could help build a student body with more “merit,” 
though not as that term is defi ned by U.S. News.
46. LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES, supra note 20, at 6.
47. ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. It would be helpful if the section would 
also set standards for what qualifi es as “need”-based fi nancial aid. These standards should 
be precise enough that observers can meaningfully compare one school’s policies and 
performance with another’s.
48. Id. at 41. The Department of Education’s current mandate is a prerequisite for the eligibility 
for student loans for the students of each law school.
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developments, in my opinion. If law schools are going to continue to devote 
nearly all aid to “merit,” because of rankings competition, they should at 
least have to endure whatever public shame or guilty conscience results from 
devoting little aid to students with “need.” And given the levels of debt held 
by many law school graduates, surely as many debt-counseling opportunities 
as possible should be made available to them. Within the very complicated 
system for managing and paying student debt, a graduate can make many 
choices, and the best option is often not obvious. I also note that both changes 
are ones that schools could adopt without a requirement by the section, so law 
faculty who share my opinion can urge such actions at their schools.
